46e5b5a41e
New Service.is_pilot flag - a pilot is a Service (type RDP) that: - is excluded from /api/public/services-by-category and /api/request-more-access (admin-granted only, no self-service) - still shows as a locked card on the dashboard for users without access (Доступно по запросу section), but with a По приглашению badge instead of the self-request button/flow - gets its own non-clickable teaser row on the public /login page (logos only, informational) RdpSlot.assigned_user_id (nullable) - pilot slots are bound to one specific user instead of being drawn from the shared pool; regular RDP services are unaffected (field stays NULL, same pool behaviour as before). The /go/ allocator branches on service.is_pilot to pick the caller's assigned slot instead of any free one. Slots release automatically (cleanup_loop) when the owning grant is revoked or expires, and immediately on manual ACL revoke. UserServiceAccess.expires_at (nullable) - per-grant access window, used by pilots so their access can be shorter than the account's own expires_at; NULL (unchanged default) means "follow the account". has_access() and the dashboard's granted/locked split both honour it. Admin UI: "Это пилот" checkbox on the RDP service form, an assign-user dropdown on a pilot's slot table (replaces the occupied-by column), and a per-pilot expiry date field in the user ACL grid. Schema is applied via the existing ensure_schema_compatibility() idempotent ALTER TABLE pattern (no alembic in this project) - no manual migration step needed, it runs at container startup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
154 lines
4.7 KiB
Python
154 lines
4.7 KiB
Python
import secrets
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from typing import Optional
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from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
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from fastapi.responses import RedirectResponse
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from itsdangerous import BadSignature, URLSafeTimedSerializer
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from passlib.context import CryptContext
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from config import COOKIE_MAX_AGE, COOKIE_NAME, CSRF_COOKIE
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from database import get_db
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from models import User, UserServiceAccess
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from utils import now_utc
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from sqlalchemy import select
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import os
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_SIGNING_KEY = os.getenv("SIGNING_KEY", secrets.token_urlsafe(32))
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serializer = URLSafeTimedSerializer(_SIGNING_KEY, salt="portal-auth")
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pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["argon2"], deprecated="auto")
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def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
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return pwd_context.hash(password)
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def verify_password(password: str, password_hash: str) -> bool:
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return pwd_context.verify(password, password_hash)
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def user_is_valid(user: User) -> bool:
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return bool(user.active and user.expires_at > now_utc())
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def issue_auth_cookie(response: RedirectResponse, user: User) -> None:
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token = serializer.dumps({"user_id": user.id})
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response.set_cookie(
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key=COOKIE_NAME,
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value=token,
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httponly=True,
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secure=True,
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samesite="strict",
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max_age=COOKIE_MAX_AGE,
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path="/",
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)
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def issue_csrf_cookie(response: RedirectResponse) -> str:
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token = secrets.token_urlsafe(24)
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response.set_cookie(
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key=CSRF_COOKIE,
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value=token,
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httponly=False,
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secure=True,
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samesite="lax",
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max_age=COOKIE_MAX_AGE,
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path="/",
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)
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return token
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def get_current_user(request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -> Optional[User]:
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raw = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME)
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if not raw:
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return None
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try:
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payload = serializer.loads(raw, max_age=COOKIE_MAX_AGE)
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except BadSignature:
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return None
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user = db.get(User, int(payload["user_id"]))
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if not user or not user_is_valid(user):
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return None
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return user
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def require_user(user: Optional[User] = Depends(get_current_user)) -> User:
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if not user:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Unauthorized")
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return user
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def require_admin(user: User = Depends(require_user)) -> User:
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if not user.is_admin:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Admin only")
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return user
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def validate_csrf(request: Request) -> None:
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cookie = request.cookies.get(CSRF_COOKIE)
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form_val = request.headers.get("X-CSRF-Token")
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if request.headers.get("content-type", "").startswith("application/x-www-form-urlencoded"):
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return
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if not cookie or not form_val or cookie != form_val:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="CSRF failed")
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def has_access(db: Session, user_id: int, service_id: int) -> bool:
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access = db.scalar(
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select(UserServiceAccess).where(
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UserServiceAccess.user_id == user_id,
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UserServiceAccess.service_id == service_id,
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)
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)
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if access is None:
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return False
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# A per-grant expires_at (used by pilots, whose access window can be
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# shorter than the account's own expires_at) overrides the account
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# expiry for this one product. NULL means "follow the account".
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if access.expires_at is not None and access.expires_at <= now_utc():
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return False
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return True
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import threading
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import time
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_login_attempts: dict = {}
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_login_lock = threading.Lock()
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_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5
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_LOGIN_WINDOW = 300 # сброс счётчика через 5 минут
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_LOGIN_BLOCK = 900 # блокировка на 15 минут
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def check_login_rate_limit(ip: str) -> Optional[float]:
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"""Возвращает blocked_until (time.monotonic) если IP заблокирован, иначе None."""
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now = time.monotonic()
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with _login_lock:
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entry = _login_attempts.get(ip)
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if not entry:
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return None
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if entry["blocked_until"] > now:
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return entry["blocked_until"]
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if now - entry["first"] > _LOGIN_WINDOW:
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del _login_attempts[ip]
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return None
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def record_login_failure(ip: str) -> None:
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now = time.monotonic()
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with _login_lock:
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entry = _login_attempts.get(ip)
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if not entry or now - entry["first"] > _LOGIN_WINDOW:
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_login_attempts[ip] = {"count": 1, "first": now, "blocked_until": 0.0}
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entry = _login_attempts[ip]
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else:
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entry["count"] += 1
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if entry["count"] >= _LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS:
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entry["blocked_until"] = now + _LOGIN_BLOCK
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def record_login_success(ip: str) -> None:
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with _login_lock:
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_login_attempts.pop(ip, None)
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